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Abstract
Multi-agent and temporal logics are active domains in Information Sciences, CS and AI. Atten-
tion has predominantly focused on logics based at transitive relational models, with particular
emphasis on transitive time. This however does not seem to be a very reliable assumption. Non-
transitivity of passing information may be demonstrated with relative ease through persuasive
examples. Therefore, in this paper, we introduce and study multi-agent temporal logics based at
linear non-transitive time. The one more innovative step is consideration of incomplete informa-
tion: the information/knowledge with lacunas, – the linear time with forgettable intervals of time
in past. Technically, the most important problems are problems of satisfiability and decidability
of suggested logics. The main results are found by us algorithms which compute satisfiability
and solve decidability (and so provide solutions to these problems). The paper concludes by
posing a series of open problems.
Keywords: temporal logic, computability, information, multi-agent logic, satisfia-
bility, decidability, deciding algorithms, non-transitive time
1 Introduction
Information and knowledge are inherent within Computer Science (CS) and Informa-
tion Sciences (IS). Computational aspects analyzing knowledge (often referred to as
computational intelligence) have formed a solid branch within CS and IS (using as a
base instruments from mathematics and models of symbolic computation). The more
technical aspects are often occupied with the construction of efficient algorithms for
handling information, retrieving new information from known facts (these construc-
tions are reasonably often implemented via different proof systems, tableau, robust
information systems).
In Reasoning about Knowledge, MIT press, 1995 [5], Fagin, et al, presumably first
time, in a very systematic manner, summaries the modeling of knowledge interpreted
via the multi-agent’s approach based at relational Kripke-Hintikka like models. An
essential feature of this approach is the usage of the multi-agent’s logic with agent’s
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knowledge operations Ki behaving as S5- modalities. Another efficient tool from this
book was temporal logic, which is easy to comprehend since knowledge is collected
in a time environment, an important resource. In turn, temporal logic is a popular area
in CS and AI (cf. e.g. Gabbay and Hodkinson [6, 7, 8]). Linear temporal logic LTL
(with Until and Next) was introduced by Manna and Pnueli [12, 13]; efficient tools for
satisfiability in LTL based at automaton theory were suggested by Vardi [24, 25]; LTL
found usage for analyzing protocols of computations and verification of consistency,
compatibility and other characteristics from CS.
Starting from the objective general multi-disciplinary environment, knowledge was
often analyzed via multi-agent techniques, various agent’s qualities, e.g. interaction or
autonomy, effects of cooperation, etc were investigated (cf. e.g. Wooldridge et al
[27, 28, 29], Lomuscio et al [11, 3]). For mathematical description of information and
knowledge, tools of modal and other non-classical logics were efficiently used. This
approach was created by Hintikka [10] (1962) in the book: Knowledge and Belief.
Since then, the framework based at non classical logic has repeatedly demonstrated
its efficiency (cf. e.g. Artemov [1], Balbiani, Vakarelov [4], Halpern [9], Vakarelov
[26]). In particular, we earlier studied multi-agent’s logic with distances, the satisfi-
ability problem for it was solved (Rybakov et al [20]); models for the conception of
Chance Discovery in multi-agents environment were developed (Rybakov [21, 22]); a
logic modeling uncertainty via agent’s views was investigated (cf. McLean et al [14]);
representation of agents interaction (as a dual of the common knowledge - an ele-
gant conception suggested and developed in Fagin et al [5]) was suggested in Rybakov
[15, 18, 19].
The aim of this paper is construction of a logical framework for handling incom-
plete information and knowledge of agents (with lacunas, for instance, – with fragments
of forgotten information in the past) in non-transitive temporal logic. The bases of our
approach is suggested through mathematical (symbolic) models for the agent’s knowl-
edge; they use linear time distributed along transitive time-intervals (maximal amount
of events which agents may remember) and the agent’s time-accessibility relations. The
latter may be not complete; agents may not remember the same amount of events, and
so accessibility relations may be non-transitive. These models are generalizations of
Kripke-Hintikka relational models (which are an efficient tool for modal and temporal
logic, for non-classical logics overall).
To reason about properties of information, to evaluate statements of truth, we use
a language of multi-agent’s logic combined with the language of temporal logic. Cho-
sen rules for computation truth values for statements (coded by formulas) handle the
presence of lacunas in knowledge collected from past (so to say, – take to account for-
gotten past). We define the logic based on these models as the set of all formulas (in the
chosen logical language) which are true for all models. Main problems that we study
are satisfiability problem and decidability problem for this logic. We solve them via
finding algorithms verifying satisfiability and solving decidability. In the final part of
the paper, a version of our original logic with admission non-bounded time relation is
considered; the problem of decidability is also solved.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the models (semantics)
and introduce the language, define our logic MAIntLin - multi-agent, linear, intransitive
logic. The novelty here, in particular, is the fact that the time in these models is not
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transitive. We comment and justify chosen models, providing illustrative examples ex-
plaining why admission about transitivity of time is not always correct and how the
presence of incomplete information may be handled in our approach. Section 3 devel-
ops mathematical techniques for our relational multi–agent models. We use approach
of transformation the formulas to rules and a construction their reduced normal forms
(which drastically simplifies constructions and proofs because these rules do not allow
nested logical operations). The main content is Theorem 14 stating that the satisfiabil-
ity problem forMAIntLin is decidable (and hence the logicMA
Int
Lin is decidable). We find
an algorithm which computes satisfiability of formulas, solves the decidability problem
for MAIntLin . Section 4 considers another version of the logic MA
Int
Lin - the one which
allows insight to all the past (so to say with the one omniscient agent which remem-
ber all the past). We extend the techniques from Sections 3 and 4 and show that this
logic also is decidable (Theorem 24). The paper concludes by posing a series of open
problems.
2 Multi-Agent’s Linear Temporal Logic Based at Non-
transitive Time
Our aim is to built a logical framework for computation (evaluation) truth values of
statements describing information and knowledge in multi-agent environment. We will
offer models formalizing information being based at temporal states of computations,
therefore the logical language we will apply forms an extension of the one for the
temporal logic. The formulas of this language are built up from a (an infinite) set of
propositional letters Pr, boolean logical operations ^;_;!;: and the set of temporal
operations: unary operation N (next) and a set of binary temporal operations Uj (until
for the agent j), where j 2 Ag (Ag is supposed to be a set of all agents under con-
sideration). So, the language is an extension of the language of the standard temporal
linear logic with a new finite set of logical operations of the sort until. The formation
rules for formulas are as usual. That is: for any p 2 Pr, p is a formula, if ' and  are
formulas then ' ^  , ' _  , '!  , :', 'Uj and N' are formulas.
We will illustrate a bit later flexibility of this language and its usage for computa-
tional intelligence. Now we introduce symbolic mathematical models — semantics for
our logic.
Definition 1 An multi-agent, linear, non-transitive frame is a tuple
ALFIn = hWALFIn ; (
[
2In;j2[1;k]
hR;ji);Nxt ; i; such that
 WALFIn :=
S
2InN It[], where N is the set of all natural numbers; for any
 2 In, d() 2 In; d() >  and It[] is the closed interval of all natural
numbers situated between  and d() (i.e., in particular, containing also both 
and d()), so It[] = [; d()]);
 81; 2 2 In, 1 6= 2 ) (1; d(1)) \ (2; d(2)) = ;;
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 any R;j is the restriction of the standard linear order () in the interval It[]
on a subset Dom;j  It();
 8j 2 [1; k]; Rj :=
S
2InR;j; (note that then any Rj is non-transitive but
linear);
 Nxt is the standard next relation on N : [n Nxt m] iffm = n+ 1; we will write
Nxt(a) = b to denote that b = a+ 1 .
Notice that we consider (
S
2In;J2[1;k]hR;ji) as not a binary relation, but as the
infinite countable set of finite binary relations R;j . Any d() 2 In for any  is the
measure of intransitivity, we interpret [; d()] as the maximal interval of time which
agents may remember at time point .
We will use notation jALFInj for the base setWALFIn of ALFIn, also for short
we will write a 2 ALFIn to say that a 2 jALFInj.
My may, for example, consider the relations R;j and  actually directed to past,
and a  b would mean that b was earlier than a, b is past for a. We may consider
the memory of agents which may have gaps, i.e. agents remember the past but not
continuously. E.g. for an agent 1 at point 3 from [3; d(3)], where d(3) = 12, R3;1 may
be  on [3; 4; 5][ [7; 9][ [11; 12], that is the agent does not remember time points 6, 8
and 10.
This approach may also interpret the case when the length of memory of all agents
may be different (they may have different volume of storage for past). That works if we
consider some gaps in relationsR;j on [; d()] immediately before d(). In particular
it is admissible if all agents have gaps before d(). This means that potentially measure
of intransitivity of time might be big, but all agents do not reach its limit – point d().
As usual for temporal logic, for each ALFIn we may define a model by introduc-
tion a valuation V on ALFIn for a set of propositional letters p: V (p)  WALFIn ,
and extend it to all formulas as follows:
Definition 2 For any a 2WALFIn and j 2 Ag:
(ALFIn; a) V p , p 2 V (p);
(ALFIn; a) V :' , (ALFIn; a) 1V ';
(ALFIn; a) V (' ^  ) , ((ALFIn; a) V ') ^ ((ALFIn; a) V  );
(ALFIn; a) V (' _  ) , ((ALFIn; a) V ') _ ((ALFIn; a) V  );
(ALFIn; a) V (' !  ) , ((ALFIn; a) V  ) _ ((ALFIn; a) 1V  );
for formulas 'Uj we define the truth value as follows:
(ALFIn; a) V (' Uj  ) ,
9(a 2 It()) & 9b[(aR;jb) ^ ((ALFIn; b) V  )^
8c[(c 2 Dom;j & aR;jc & c < b))(ALFIn; c) V ']];
(ALFIn; a) V N' , [(a Nxt b)) (ALFIn; b) V ']:
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(ALFIn; a) V ' to be read the formula ' is true (valid) at the state a w.r.t. the
valuation V .
Definition 3 The logic MAIntLin is the set of all formulas which are valid in any model
based at any ALFIn frame.
We illustrate below why we admit that time might be non-transitive.
Standpoint (i). Individual human being view. If we interpret time in the past as a
line of all events which we individually remember, and time flows as a chain of events
which individuals know and pass to each other, the things are clear. We do not know
and do not remember all what our ancestors knew.
Standpoint (ii). Computational view. Inspections of protocols for computations are
limited by time resources and have non-uniform length (else, at any point of inspection,
verification may refer to stored old protocols). Therefore, if we interpret our models as
the ones reflecting verification of computations, the amount of available check points
is finite, but not all of them might be in disposal for inspection in a given time point.
Standpoint (iii). Agent’s-admins view. We may consider states (worlds of our
model) as checkpoints of admins (agents) for inspections of behavior a network in past.
Any admin has allowed amount of inspections for previous states, but only within the
areas of its (his/her) responsibility (by security or another reasons). Thus, the acces-
sibility is not transitive again. An admin (a1) can reach a state, and therein, an admin
(a2) responsible for this state (it may be a new one or the same one as well) has again
some allowed amount of inspections to the past. But, in total, (a1) cannot inspect all
states accessible for (a2).
Standpoint (iv). Agent’s-user’s view. If we consider the states of models as the
content of web pages available for users, any surf step is accessibility relation, and
starting from any web page user may achieve, using links in hypertext(s), some fore-
most available web sites. The latter one may have web links which are only available
for individuals possessing passwords for accessibility. Users having password may
continue web surf longer. Clearly that in this approach, web surfing appears to be a
non-transitive relation. That is, if we interpret web surf as time-steps, the accessibility
is intransitive.
Standpoint (v). View on time in past for collecting knowledge. In human percep-
tion, only some finite intervals of time in past are available to individuals to inspect
evens and to record knowledge collected until the current time state. The time in past,
in our feelings, looks as linear and we have only a finite amount of memory to remem-
ber information and events. There, in past, at foremost available (memorable) time
point, individuals again had a memorable interval of time with collected information,
and so forth. So, time in the past, generally speaking, looks as not transitive if we
interpret it via collecting knowledge.
Now we pause briefly to comment why we consider incomplete information: the
knowledge of the agents with forgotten information in past.
(i) Let we interpret the agent’s knowledge as the protocols of different concurrent
computations: several parallel threads of a computation. Then, first, some protocols
may contains an information received at a step i while others may miss it. That may
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happen by hardware failure or by specific behavior of the software for different com-
putational threads. Thus, in interpretation of this situation, our R;j may not cover all
time interval [; d()], theirs domains D;j may be smaller than [; d()] itself.
(ii) Similar comment may be refereed to human memory and records of different
authors about historical events. Some others remember particular historical events,
others not. It might be that dark ages after ancient Greece could be interpreted that way
- by some reason total majority of historians do not remember events of that time.
(iii) Let us consider a set of agents: admins, - analyzing behavior of a network.
Sequences of their steps in this analysis may be paths along the same transmission line.
But paths may be different - some may have gaps because some admins could have no
authority, passwords to achieve protocols located in particular nodes of the network.
So these nodes will be not achievable for their analysis.
In the sequel, we may consider any state a 2 N as a time point and any [; d()]
as the time interval available for the agents responsible for verification/reasoning in the
time points a 2 [; d()]. Time (; R;j – in our formalization) may be directed to past
or future - depending on the particular case which we wish to model. Now we would
like to comment the choice of our models in a bit more formal manner.
(1) Interpretation of R;j as agent’s accessibility relations. We consider relations
R;j on [; d()] with domains which do not compulsory include all worlds from
[; d()]. That is admitted to represent some cases when certain elements of past may
be forgotten as it is commented above, when the information is incomplete.
(2) All the intervals of time [; d()];  2 In are finite to represent bounded amount
of memory about past. Though links from [; d()] to [d(); d(d())] viaNxt(d()) =
d()+1 and all Rd();j are present; so, by intransitive iterations we may go to past and
analyze collected information. In particular, we obtained that all Rj may be linear but
not transitive.
(3) The operations Uj are defined also in non-standard way in order to represent
forgettable past (lacunas) in memory:
(ALFIn; a) V (' Uj  ) , 9(a 2 It()) & 9b[(aR;jb) ^ ((ALFIn; b) V  )^
8c[(c 2 Dom;j & aR;jc & c < b))(ALFIn; c) V ']]:
This rule says that there is a state b in past before a, which the agent j remember,
where the statement  is true, and in all states which are situated after b but before a
and which the agent j still remember the statement ' is true.
(4) The presence of different agent’s accessibility relations R;j does not allow
simply ignore states which are outside the domain of a particular relation R;j , but
inside [; d()] because these states may be inside domains of some other relations
R;j1 . So, ' U1  may be true at some state a, but ' U2  to be false at a.
Examples.
(i) The formula :31'^N' represents impossible for the standard linear temporal
logics property: The statement ' is true at the next temporal point, but still is impos-
sible from temporal viewpoint. In our agent’s interpretation we have: ' was true at
yesterday, but the agent 1 does not remember yesterday.
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(ii) Else unusual property: :31' ^ N21': This formula says that yesterday and
always before it the statement ' was true at all states which the agent 1 remember.
But today the agent 1 does not remember that yesterday and what always been before
yesterday (that is there is a lacuna in his memory since yesterday).
(iii) The formula 21' ^ 31[N (:' ^ 21')] describes the following environment.
Since today and until the last remembered state the statement ' was true from view-
point of the agent a1 in the all states which he remember (knows). But at the last
remembered state ' was false at its predecessor, though again true in all its remem-
bered predecessors.
(iv) The formula ('U1 ) ^ (: ) ^ :31' says that not today, but in past  was
true, but the agent a1 does not remember it, in particular, no one state before the first
one where  was true.
(v) The formula ' ^ (' ! N') ^ 21(' ! N') ^ :NN' says that today and
yesterday ' was true, but the agent a1 does not remember yesterday.
(vi) The formula21'^'^:2121' says, in particular, that the time is not transitive
from viewpoint of the agent (a1). But actually, this formula says bigger that this. It says
that the agent (a1) may achieve the last remembered state, and only being in this state
(a1) may achieve one still later sate where ' was false.
(v) The formula [
W
XAg;jjXjjjjAgjj=2[
V
2X('Uj )]] ! 'U1 says that the
agent (a1) very easy follows the majority of the agents Ag: if at least half of agents
believe that ' holds until  will hold, (a1) also accept it.
3 Decision Algorithm
Recall that for any logic L the satisfiability problem is to determine by any given for-
mula ' if this formula is satisfiable in L. That is, if there is a model where ' true (if
there is an algorithm answering this question for any given ', the satisfiability problem
is said to be decidable). A logic L is decidable if there is an algorithm answering for
any formula ' if ' 2 L holds (if ' is a theorem of L). These problems are mutu-
ally connected: ' is satisfiable in L iff :' =2 L; ' 2 L iff :' is not satisfiable; so
decidability itself implies that satisfiability problem is decidable and vice versa.
Definition 4 A formula ' is said to be refuted at a world a 2 WALFIn of a model
based at a frame ALFIn with a valuation V iff (ALFIn; a) 1V '.
For any model based at a frame
ALFIn = hWALFIn ; (
[
2In;j2[1;k]
hR;ji);Nxt ; i
and a natural number m  0 the model ALFIn(m) obtained from ALFIn is the
model based on the set
jALFInj n
[
fIt[] j  2 In;  = dt(0); t > m+ 2g;
where we re-define Nxt assuming Nxt(dm+2(0)) = dm+2(0) and any accessibility
relationRdm+2(0);j to be the standard on [dm+2(0); dm+2(0)], and assume all letters
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to be true at dm+2(0). The definition of inductive steps for computation of the truth
values of formulas remains to be the same as earlier. For a formula , td() denotes
the temporal degree of .
Lemma 5 Let  be a formula and td() = g. If  is refuted in a frame ALFIn =
hWALFIn ; (
S
2In;j2[1;k]hR;ji);Nxt ; i at the world 0 then  can be refuted at 0 in a
model based on a frame ALFIn(g + 1).
Proof is a rather standard induction. We need an axillary statement: for anym 2 N ,
for all formulas ,
td()  n ) [8a 2 [dm(0); dm+1(0)]  ALFIn
(ALFIn; a) V  , (ALFIn(m+ n+ r)  ; 8r  1: (1)
Indeed, for n = 0 it is evident. Let (1) holds for all n  n1 and we have a formula 
of temporal degree n1+1. Then  is a formula constructed out of formulas i with tem-
poral degree at most n1 and some formulas i with temporal degree n1 +1 by boolean
logical operations. For formulas i we apply (1) to the interval [dm(0); dm+1(0)] itself
and obtain:
8a 2 [dm(0); dm+1(0)]; (ALFIn; a) V i ,
(ALFIn(m+ n1 + r); a)  i; 8r  1 (2)
For any formula i we may assume, i = i;1Uji;2, or i = Ni. If i = i;1Uji;2
by (2) we obtain:
8a 2 [dm(0); dm+1(0)]; (ALFIn; a) V i;k ,
(ALFIn(m+ n1 + r); a)  i;k; 8r  1; (3)
and hence 8a 2 [dm(0); dm+1(0)]
(ALFIn; a) V i;1Uji;2 , (ALFIn(m+ n1 + r); a)  i;1Uji;2; 8r  1:
Let i = Ni. If a < dm+1(0) we apply the same reasoning as for i = i;1Uji;2
above. If a = dm+1(0) we first apply (2) to the interval [dm+1(0); dm+2(0)] and
obtain:
8b 2 [dm+1(0); dm+2(0)]; (ALFIn; b) V i ,
(ALFIn(m+ n1 + r); b)  i; 8r  1:
Consequently,
(ALFIn; dm+1(0)) V Ni , (ALFIn(m+ n1 + r); dm+1(0) V Ni:
Thus, we showed that (1) holds for n = m1 + 1, and by induction it holds for all n.
This conduces the proof of our lemma if we takem = 0. Q.E.D.
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Lemma 6 If a formula  is refuted in a model based at a frame ALFIn(m) at the
world 0, then  may be refuted in a model based at a standard frame ALFIn.
Proof is trivial: it is sufficient to blow out the frameALFIn(m) to the infinite one.
Indeed, consider the final interval [dm(0)); dm+1(0)] of the frame ALFIn(m) and
adjoin to ALFIn(m) starting from [dm+1(0); dm+1(0)] infinite sequence of intervals
[ai; bi]; i 2 N with Nxt(ai) = bi, Nxt(bi) = ai+1 and the valuation of the letters on
this new worlds to be the same as it has been at the state dm+1(0). It is easy to see
that this modification will not effect the truth values of formulas on the initial interval
[0; dm+1(0)]. Q.E.D.
Therefore, due to Lemmas 5 and 6, bearing in mind to find solving algorithm
for decidability we may restrict ourselves with only models based on frames of kind
ALFIn(m).
For our logic MAIntLin the usual standard techniques (as for instance in [19, 18]),
cannot be directly implemented because the time relations are not transitive. For in-
stance, the non-transitivity hampers to convert formulas in more suitable and simple
forms. The technique of reduction formulas to rules (which we already used earlier
many times for different purpose (cf. e.g.. [17, 19, 23]) here will be very useful. This
approach efficiently simplifies all proofs because it allows to consider very simple and
uniform formulas without nested temporal operations. Few definitions below will ex-
plain this approach. A rule is an expression
r :=
'1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn)
 (x1; : : : ; xn)
;
where'1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn) and (x1; : : : ; xn) are formulas constructed
out of letters (variables) x1; : : : ; xn.
Meaning of r is:  (x1; : : : ; xn) (which is called conclusion) follows (logically
follows) from assumptions '1(x1; : : : ; xn); : : : ; 'l(x1; : : : ; xn) . The definition of a
rule to be valid is the same for any relational model:
Definition 7 For a modelM, r is valid (true) inM iff: [8a ((M; a) V
V
1il 'i)] )
8a ((M; a) V  ): That is: as soon as all premises of r are true at all states fromM
then the conclusion if true at all states as well. If this is not a case, we say r is refuted
in M, or refuted in M by V , and write M 1V r. A rule r is valid in a frame F
(notation F  r) if it is valid in any model based at F .
For any formula ', we may convert it to rule rule x! x='.
Lemma 8 For any formula ', ' is a theorem of MAIntLin (that is ' 2 MAIntLin ) iff the
rule (x! x=') is valid in any frame forMAIntLin .
Proof is self evident.
Definition 9 A rule r is said to be in reduced normal form if r = "=x1 where
" :=
_
1jl
[
^
1in
x
t(j;i;0)
i ^
^
1in
(Nxi)
t(j;i;1) ^
^
l2[1;k];1i;kn
(xiUlxk)
t(j;i;k;l)];
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t(j; i; z); t(j; i; k; l) 2 f0; 1g and, for any formula  above,
0 := , 1 := :.
Definition 10 For any given rule r, a rule rnf in the reduced normal form is a normal
form of r iff, for any frameALFIn for our logicMAIntLin the following holdsALFIn 
r , ALFIn  rnf :
Theorem 11 There exists an algorithm running in (single) exponential time, which,
for any given rule r, constructs some its reduced form rnf .
Proof of similar statement for various logics been suggested by us quite a while
ago (e.g. it is a literal repetition of the proof for the logic LTL itself; for instance, cf.
Lemma 5 in [2], or proof of similar statements in [16, 17]). Q.E.D.
Bearing in mind suggested sequence of steps, a formula ' is a theorem of MAIntLin
(i.e. ' 2 MAIntLin ) iff the rule r := p! p=' is valid at all frames ALFIn (cf. Lemma
8) and iff its reduced form rnf is valid at all framesALFIn (cf. Theorem 11). This, to
solve the satisfiability problem, we may consider only rules in reduced forms.
Lemma 12 If a rule in a normal form rnf is refuted in a model based at a frame
ALFIn(g) then rnf can be refuted in some such frame where 8 2 In, d()    
r(D) + 2, where r(D) is the number of disjuncts in rnf .
Proof. Let rnf = "=x1 where " =
W
1jv j ,
j = [
^
1in
x
t(j;i;0)
i ^
^
1in
(N xi)
t(j;i;1) ^
^
s2[1;k];1i;kn
(xiUsxk)
t(j;i;k;l)]; let
rnf be refuted in a given frame ALFIn(g) by a valuation V .
By our assumption about the refutation the rule, for any a from the base set of
ALFIn(g) there is some unique disjunct j from the premise of rnf which is true at a:
(ALFIn(g); a) V j ;
denote this unique disjunct by (a).
Consider any [; d()] for  2 In. If d() =  + 1 we do nothing. Otherwise
consider Nxt() and the greatest number Nx1() from [; d()) strictly bigger than
Nxt() (if one exists) such that (Next()) = (Nx1()).
We now rarefy [; d()] by removing all states situated strictly between  and
Nx1() and set that Nxt() = Nx1(), the valuation on the model remains to be
the same as earlier. The relatuions RDenotetheobtainingframebyALFIn(r; g) and
the model byMALFIn(r; g).
Lemma 13 For any a 2 [; d()] \ ALFIn(r; g) and any  ,
(ALFIn(g); a) V  , (ALFIn(r; g); a) V : (4)
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Proof. If a  Nx1() this is evident because we changed nothing above Nx1().
If a =  then the correspondences of the truth of the components of j are evident for
all the cases except the operations Us.
Assume first that (ALFIn(g); ) V xi1Usxi;2. Then there is b 2 Dom;s such
that
[(R;sb) ^ ((ALFIn(g); b) V xi;2) &
8c[(c 2 Dom;s & R;sc & c < b))(ALFIn(g); c) V xi1 ]]:
Take minimal b with these properties. If b =  all is clear. If b >  then b  Nxt()
and if b  Nx1() then we have
(ALFIn(g); Nx1()) V xi1Usxi;2;
and consequently (ALFIn(r; g); ) V xi1Usxi;2.
Assume now that b < Nx1() and b > , that is Nxt()  b < Nx1(). Then
because (Nxt()) = (Nx1()) we have
(ALFIn(g); Nx1(i)) V xi1Usxi;2 and (ALFIn(r; g); Nx1(i)) V xi1Usxi;2
and since (ALFIn(g); ) V xi1Usxi;2 we conclude that if  2 Dom;s than (ALFIn(d); ) V
xi1 ; and consequently
(ALFIn(r; g); ) V xi1Usxi;2:
For opposite direction, let (ALFIn(r; g); ) V xi1Usxi;2. Than
9b 2 jALFIn(r; g)j; [(R;sb) ^ (ALFIn(r; g); b) V xi;2) &
8c[(c 2 ALFIn(r; g) \Dom;s & R;sc & c < b))(ALFIn(r; g); c) V xi1 ]:
Take minimal b with this property. If b =  then all is done. Otherwise b  Nx1()
and consequently
(ALFIn(r; g); Nx1()) V xi1Usxi;2 and (ALFIn(g); Nx1()) V xi1Usxi;2
Since (Nxt()) = (Nx1()) we conclude that
(ALFIn(g); Nxt()) V xi1Usxi;2:
If  62 Dom;s we obtain (ALFIn(g); ) V xi1Usxi;2.
If  2 Dom;s, then (ALFIn(r; g); ) V xi1Usxi;2 implies
(ALFIn(r; g); ) V xi1
and (ALFIn(g); ) V xi1 what together with ALFIn(g); Nxt()) V xi1Usxi;2
allows us to conclude that (ALFIn(g); ) V xi1Usxi;2. Lemma 13 is proved. Q.E.D.
Now, instead of [; d()] we consider the interval [Nx1()(d())] and apply to
[Nx1(); d())] the same rarefication procedure as for [; d()] above. Analog of
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Lemma 13 will hold, and it will not effect the truth of formulas  on . We then
continue this procedure which stops in at most r(D) steps and we obtain d()    
r(D) + 2. Doing this transformation for all  2 In and [; d()] we accomplish the
proof of Lemma 12. Q.E.D.
Combining Lemmas 5, 6, 8, 12 and Theorem 11 we obtain
Theorem 14 The satisfiability problem for the logic MAIntLin is decidable: there is an
algorithm, described in the series of cited lemmas, which verify satisfiability. The logic
MAIntLin is decidable.
We would like to conclude this section by extensions obtained results to rules, but
not only to formulas themselves. As we demonstrated, rules are more general formal-
ization and they do cover the case of formulas by consideration rules with always true
premise.
Definition 15 A rule r is valid in logicMAIntLin if for any frameALFIn from the set of
frames generatingMAIntLin , r is valid atMA
Int
Lin .
Similar to the Theorem 14 above, using the same preliminary results, we obtain
Theorem 16 Logic MAIntLin is decidable w.r.t. valid inference rules: there is an algo-
rithm, described in the series of cited lemmas, which verify validness.
We pause briefly to comment this result. The validness of a rule in any transitive
temporal (for instance in LTL itself) or modal logic may be easily represented by for-
mula. E.g. a rule '= is valid iff 2' ^ ' !  is a theorem of LTL (where as earlier
3' := >U';2 := :3:). It is not a case for intransitive temporal or modal logics
because any operation 2 and even any finite composition of it 2n are always local and
cannot describe properties of all frames. For instance, for any numbers k and n the rule
N k2nx=x is valid in our logic MAIntLin (it is an easy exercise to verify it), but no way
to describe it by a formula.
4 Transitivization, Insight to all Past
In this concluding section, using collected techniques we would like to study a version
of theMAIntLin , when we will admit infinite insight, an agent which may check all past,
remembers all past. This looks like we would like to admit logical operations of sort:
31' = 9m3m', so to say - transitivization of our agent’s accessibility relations. Or
even more precisely, to admit the operation: 21' = ' ^ 8mNm'. This resembles a
need for a technique similar to the used one for conception of common knowledge from
[5]. We would like to approach this task via solution more general case: to consider
standard onN as a new additional relation onALFIn - it is the standard linear order,
and consider the new logical operation U - simply the standard until operation as it has
been defined at the linear temporal logic itself initially. That is we will interpret U as
follows:
8a 2 N; (ALFIn; a) V ('U ), 9b[(a  b) ^ ((ALFIn; b) V  )^
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8c[(a  c < b)) (ALFIn; c) V ']]:
The modified frame will be denoted as ALFIn;, for sake of uniform notation, in the
sequel, U will be denoted by U0.
Definition 17 The logic MAInt;1Lin is the set of all formulas which are valid in any
model based at any ALFIn; frame.
To work with this logic we may directly use results and elements of proofs from
the previous section which will make proofs shorter, transparent and very compact.
Lemma 18 If a rule in a normal form rnf is refuted in a model based at a frame
ALFIn; then rnf can be refuted in some such frame where 8 2 In, d()    
r(D) + 2, where r(D) is the number of disjuncts in rnf .
Proof. We may verbatim repeat the proof of Lemma 12. The matter is that the
presence of U0 does not effect the steps of proof for (4). Simply we consider U0 as
one of Us inside intervals [; d()] and we do the steps for the proof of (4) for all 
simultaneously. Q.E.D.
For any frame ALFIn; (or a model based on a such frame) and any numbers
m = dv(0); v > 2; n = dv1(0) > dv+1(0) from the base set of this frame (simi-
lar to the earlier), ALFIn;;m;n is the frame (model) obtained from the original one
by assumption Nxt(dv1 1(0)) = dv(0) and deleting totally all numbers bigger than
dv(0).
Lemma 19 If a rule in reduced normal form rnf is refuted in model based at a frame
ALFIn; at 0 with 8 2 In, d()     r(D) + 2, then rnf can be refuted in
some frame ALFIn;;m;n, for m = dv(0); v > 2; n = dv1(0) > dv+1(0) at 0, with
8 2 In, d()    r(D) + 2.
Proof. For any xi;1Usxi2 , where (ALFIn;; a) V xi;1Usxi2 the realizers for xi2
are all worlds b 2 ALFIn; such that
(i) (aR;sb) ^ ((ALFIn;; b) V x2) and
(ii) 8c[(c 2 Dom;s & aR;sc & c < b))(ALFIn;; c) V x1]:
For any xi;1Usxi2 , where (ALFIn;; d2(0)) V xi;1Usxi2 where realizers for
xi2 are situated strictly above d
2(0) consider smallest realizers r(xi;1Usxi2) from
ALFIn;, they form a set S. Let the maximal among them be the number nm.
From assumption about the refutation the rule, it follows that for any a from the
base set of our frame, there is some unique disjunct j from the premise of rnf which
is true at a:
(ALFIn;; a) V j ;
denote this unique disjunct by (a).
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Consider the minimal numbermn > nm, for which for any dv(0) > mn the list
[(dv(0)); : : : ; (dv+1(0))]
repeats for other v1 > v infinitely many times.
Consider the first interval [dv(0); dv+1(0)] strictly above mn and the set Sr of all
smallest realizers for all possible xi;1Usxi2 which are true at d
v+1(0). Let m1 be any
number strictly bigger than any one in Sr.
Consider the earliest interval [dv+w(0); dv+w+1(0)] situated strictly above the ini-
tial interval [dv(0); dv+1(0)] where dv+w(0) > m1 and the list
[(dv+w(0)); : : : ; (dv+w+1(0))]
repeats the list [(dv(0)); : : : ; (dv+1(0))]. We modify now the frame by direction:
Nxt(dv+w(0)   1) = dv(0) and then we delete all worlds situated strictly above
dv+w(0)  1.
Lemma 20 This transformation remains the truth of all subformulas of the rule rnf to
be the same as it was in the original model.
Proof. It is immediate computation bearing in mind the presence of the set of
realizers Sr chosen above being situated before [dv+w(0); dv+w+1(0)]. Q.E.D.
Using this statement we complete the proof for our Lemma 19.
Lemma 21 If a rule in normal form rnf is refuted in a model based at a frameALFIn;;m;n,
form = dv(0); v > 2; n = dv1(0) > dv+1(0) at 0 with 8 2 In, d()   r(D)+2,
then rnf can be refuted in some frame ALFIn;;m1;n1 of size effectively computed
from the size of rnf .
Proof. Indeed, first we, moving from d2(0) upwards, delete all intervals [dw(0); : : : ; dw+1(0)]
situated beforem = dv(0) > 2 with repeated
[(dw(0)); : : : ; (dw+1(0))]
together with worlds situated between of them.
Lemma 22 The deletion of any such repetition [dw(0); : : : ; dw+1(0)] does not change
the truth values of sub-formulas of the rule rnf .
Proof is an immediate computation based on the structure of the frame and the fact
of the repetition. Q.E.D.
After this transformation the part of the frame situated before dv(0) is not only
finite but else it has the effectively computable size.
Now we pick up all minimal from dv(0) intervals [df (0); df+1(0)] situated after
dv(0) (that is situated in the circle part) and containing minimal realizers r(xi;1Usxi2)
for xi;1Usxi2 which are true at d
v(0).
Let Xr be the set of all these intervals. Now we repeat the procedure described
above for the interval [0; dv(0)] but subsequently, strictly inside between of each two
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neighboring different intervals I1; I2 2 X . We delete repetitions of the intervals situ-
ated strictly between them, moving from the end of I1 to the beginning of I2. And then
we move along the circle repeating this transformation for each pair I1; I2 2 S. This
transformation will not affect the truth of sub-formulas of rnf thanks to our choice of
Xr. Lemma 21 is proved. Q.E.D.
Lemma 23 If a rule in normal form rnf is refuted in some frame ALFIn;;m;n then
rnf may be refuted in a frame ALFIn;.
Proof is an easy observation that if we will stretch the circle part from the frame
ALFIn;;m;n rolling the circle part towards future in the standard manner, we will
obtain the frame ALFIn; which preserves the truth values of sub-formulas of rnf at
the worlds and theirs copies. Q.E.D.
Using analog of Theorem 11, analog of Lemma 8, Lemmas 18, 19, 21 and 23 we
obtain
Theorem 24 The satisfiability problem for the logic MAInt;1Lin is decidable: there is
an algorithm, described in the series of cited lemmas, which verify satisfiability. The
logicMAInt;1Lin is decidable.
5 Open problems
There are many remaining open problems in suggested framework. We first would
point important typical open yet problems: the problems of axiomatization for both
logics MAIntLin and MA
Int;1
Lin , the problems of recognizing admissible rules in these
logics. The question of extension this framework to temporal logics where agent’s ac-
cessibility relations are not compulsory restricted to intervals [; d()] but may arbitrary
reach upper divisions is not investigated yet (we do not see yet now how to overcome
appearing technical difficulties; even the problem of satisfiability for such logics is
open yet). Next open attractive direction is to consider modification of suggested re-
lational non-transitive models to the case of not-discrete but continues models, based
e.g. at rational, or all real numbers.
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